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Abstract 
We prove that if n individuals start with the same prior over 
a probability space. and then each observe private information. that 
for a class of admissible statistics. if a statistic of their 
posterior probabilities of an event becomes common knowledge. then 
everyone's posterior probabilites·must be the same. The class of 
admissible statistics includes any statistic which is an invertible 
function of a stochastically monotone function. We also prove that if 
information partitions are finite. an iterative procedure of public 
announcement of the statistic--whero the statistic is publicly 
announced and then individuals recompute posterior probabilities based 
on their previous information plus the announced value of the 
statistic�converges in a finite number of steps to the common 
knowledge situation described above. The result has applications to 
Delphi type processes ior probability assessment. and to economic 
models in which private information becomes incorporated into an 
aggregate. publicly observed statistic such as a price or quantity in 
a oarkct. 
COf�!ON KNOWLEDGE, CONSENSUS AND AGGREGATE INFORMATION 
1 .  Introduction 
Richard D .  McKelvey 
Talbot Page 
California Institute of Technology 
(May 1 4 ,  1984) 
Generally speaking, information held privately by an 
individual is useless to him until he acts upon it. When several 
individuals act on their private information, some of the information 
may become incorporated into a publicly observable statistic, such as 
a price . Individuals may then make inferences from the public 
information to augment their original private information. 
In this paper we use the concept of common knowledge to study 
the aggregation of private information into a public statistic, and 
the "redistribution" of information that occurs as individuals make 
inferences from the aggregate. public information. We derive 
conditions under which information becomes so well redistributed that 
there is consensus (but not necessarily full revelation). The 
analysis applies to a wide variety of settings. including oligopoly 
pricing. parimutuel betting, a Delphi process, and some models of 
rational expectations. We discuss several examples where our 
regularity condition, along with the background assumption of common 
knowledge of initial structures. is satisfied. 
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The analysis suggests that there may be a tendency in markets. 
and other institutions that aggregate information into public 
statistics. toward consensus in beliefs. In rough terms this tendency 
may stand in parallel to the tendency in markets toward consensus in 
preferences (at the margin) as individuals equate their marginal rates 
of substitution. However, as we shall see, the conditions leading to 
consensus in beliefs are more complicated. 
We consider the case when n individuals begin with the same 
prior on a probability space. and then each obtain private 
information. They each take an action based on this information. and 
an aggregate statistic of the actions taken by all individuals is then 
made public. We assume that the aggregate statistic can be expressed 
as a function of the individuals' posterior probabilities of some 
event. We then show (Theorem 1) that if the aggregation function 
satisfies a condition we call "stochastic regularity," then whenever 
the statistic is common knowledge, all individuals must agree on the 
posterior probabilities of the event. 
We next show (Theorem 2) that with finite information 
partitions, an iterative process of public announcement of the 
statistical information converges to the situation of common knowledge 
described above. The iterative process consists of a series Of 
periods, where, in each period, individuals compute posterior 
probabilities and act on the basis of their current information. Then 
the aggregate statistical information is announced, individuals 
recompute posterior probabilities based on their previous information 
plus the new public information, and so on. 
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Finally, we show (Theorem 3 ) . that there is a close connection 
between a common knowledge situation and a rational expectations 
equilibrium. Thus, our results have implications for certain rational 
expectations models. In particular, in market models, if the 
Walrasian correspondence satisfies our regularity condition, then the 
rational expectations equilibrium is one of consensus, whether or not 
it is fully revealing. Further, the iterative process of Theorem 2 
can be interpreted as a mechanism by which individuals gradually 
refine and learn the state-price correspondence over time. 
The result of this paper generalizes results of Aumann [1978] 
and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982 ] . Aumann shows that if two 
individuals have the same prior and their posteriors of some event are 
common knowledge� then their posteriors must be equal. Geanakoplos 
and Polemarchakis (1982] show that if two individuals start with the 
same priors and then successively report their posterior probabilities 
of some event to each other, then eventually this leads to a situation 
of common knowledge where their posterior probabilities must be equal. 
This paper is more general than the cited papers in that we consider n 
individuals, and we only require an aggregate statistic of the 
posterior probabilities, rather than the posterior probabilities of 
each individual, to be common knowledge. 
Several examples illustrate the problem of information 
aggregation that we will be addressing. These examples are developed 
in more detail in Section 7 .  
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Example 1 CA Delphi Process) A panel of experts. each with his own 
private information. must. as a group, make a prediction on the 
likelihood of a certain event (i.e • •  the likelihood of a nuclear 
accident. the likelihood of a candidate winning the election. the 
likelihood the defendant is guilty. etc.) The "Delphi" method has 
been suggested as a way of pooling the information of the different 
experts in such a way as to allow individual experts to benefit from 
the information they know others to have. while at the same time 
protecting the confidentiality of each individual's information and 
also preventing some members. by force of personality. from having an 
undue influence on the group (see eg • •  Dalkey (1969]). The Delphi 
method works as follows: The experts are isolated from one another 
and each expert makes his own prediction of the likelihood based on 
his private information only. The average. or some other statistic of 
these predictions is then announced to all the experts. They then 
make new predictions, based on their original information plus 
whatever they learn from the public information. This continues until 
there is no further revision in any individual predictions. 
Example £ (Decentralized Risk Assessment with Cournot Oligopolists) 
An industry, consisting of n chemical firms is preparing to market a 
new chemical. Each firm has done its own private preliminary testing 
of the chemical's toxicity. obtaining information it does not share 
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with its competitors. Definitive tests on the toxicity of the 
chemical are being conducted by an independent firm. and will not be 
available for several years. In the meantime. firms may produce as 
much of the chemical as they wish, but if the chemical is eventually 
found to be toxic. the firm may expect to pay liability in proportion 
to its total production. In each production period, the firms have 
access to data on the total sales volume or market price of the 
chemical. 
Example � (Parimutuel Betting) Bettors at a racetrack can bet on one 
of J mutually exclusive events�i.e • •  on which horse comes in first. 
Each bettor comes to the race with some private information, but 
before he bets. he has access to aggregate data on the information of 
others. in the form of the odds of each horse. which are posted on the 
totalizer. 
Example ! (Markets with Incomplete Information) Grossman [1981) 
describes an example of an economy, with incomplete information. in 
which there is a complete set of state contingent futures markets. 
Each consumer begins with some private information. and, given any 
price vector, chooses state contingent consumption. In addition to 
his private information. each individual observes the vector of 
equilibrium prices. 
We show. in Section 7 ,  that in all of these examples, with 
appropriately chosen preferences, the public information satisfies our 
regularity conditions. Hence. in each example. if the public 
information is common knowledge, there is consensus in beliefs. 
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Further. an iterative process of public announcement will lead to this 
common knowledge situation. Finally. a rational expectations 
equilibrium to each example is also characterized by consensus. 
2. � Knowledge 
Let {n,�.p) be a probability space. and N = {1.2 • • • • •  n} be a 
set of individuals. For each i c N, we assume there is a partition fi
of n. We write .E = C.E1, • . . •  fn> for the n tuple of partitions. For
any (I) e !? • and i c N. let Pi ( w) denote the element of .E1 containing 1:i1. 
We assume P1(U1) c �for all i c N,oo e n, and write �i ��for the
a-algebra generated by fi.
To define i's posterior probability of some event A c �· we 
fix A c �. and fix a version p(Al�i) :!! � ll of the conditional 
probability of A given �i· For any state ro e  n, and agent i c N, we 
let p(A(Pi(tr>)) be the conditional probability of A given �i' evaluated
at 1u. Thus. pCAIPi(tr>)) is the posterior probability under �i of agent
i for A. So. for all P c �1•
A 
I p(AJP.(w))dp(•I • p(A n P).
p 1 
( 2 .1) 
We define .E = :e_1 /\ !!,2/\ • • • /\ � to be the meet of .E1, • • •  ·En,
and E = :e.1 V .E2V • • • V En to be the join of f1 • • • •  ·.fn· 
1 For any
A A -
ol e n, we let P(<,l) denote the element of f containing 01 and P(tU) 
7 
denote the element of f containing w. 
A 
Let � and � be the �-algebras 
A 
generated by� and e respectively. 
Following Aumann (1976]. we say an event E � n is� 
A 
knowledge at w under £ iff P(w} £ E. Aumann shows that this 
definition of common knowledge is equi.valent to the following infinite 
sequence of conditions: Each individual knows E. each knows all others 
know E. each knows that all know that all know E, etc.1
We extend Aumann's idea to define when the value of a 
statistic is common knowledge. We let A be an arbitrary set. and let 
f: n � A be a statistic. Then we say that f is £Q!!YlaQ!l knowledge at tr> 
A 
under .E iff P(w) !:: {tu' c nlf(w') = f(w)}. So f is common knowledge at 
w iff the inverse image of f(U1) is common knowledge at (I) under f. To 
say that cp is common knowledge at w is to say that once w c n is drawn 
and individuals are given their private information, each individual 
can infer the value of the statistic on the basis of his own 
information. without any further refinement of his information 
partition. Further each individual knows everyone knows the value of 
IJl(i.i), etc. 
Typically. if there is any independence in the information 
A 
sources giving rise to the individual partitions. the elements P(w) of 
the meet will be large sets, frequently with n being the only member. 
Thus, as is argued by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982), it seems 
rare that an event, or some statistic f, could be common knowledge 
without a process which refines individuals' initial information 
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partitions. One way in which T could be common knowledge is if its 
value were publicly announced with everyone present. when w is drawn.
Then each individual information partition (as well as the meet of all 
partitions) would necessarily be at least as fine as the partition 
generated by f. However. common knowledge can also arise in more 
subtle ways. as we show in subsequent sections. Section 4 shows that 
an iterative process of public announcement leads to a situation of 
common knowledge, and Section s shows that a rational eXPectations
equi.librium. is a situation where the public information. f, is common
knowledge. 
We will be concerned with the case when f takes a particular 
form. Namely, we say f is admissible if it is of the form 
t = h'q, (2.2) 
where h::tZn -7 m. and q:!l -7' :tZn is defined by. for all 1ri e n, i e N.
qi(w) = p(AIPi(w)),
(2.3) 
for some fixed A e �- Thus f is some aggregation of the individual
posterior probabilities of some event. Our main theorem investigates 
what inferences can be made about q(w) when f is common knowledge. We
show that if h satisfies certain conditions, then common knowledge of 
� at w implies consensus among individuals on the posterior 
probabilities. I.e., q.(w) = q.(0) for all i,j e N.
1 J 
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3. Stochastic Regularity 
We now define stochastic regularity, the condition on the 
information aggregation function, h. which we use in our results. Let 
n 
7l = {z e JR lo i z .! 1} be the unit interval and 7l n = n 7l be the
i=l 
unit cube in lR0• Let �
n be the Borel sets of 7l0• and !:1CZZ0> the
set of probability measures on � n. We write � for � 1•
For any � 
n measurable f:ll n-7m. we extend f to have domain
l:f(7l n) by defining. for any A e l:f(7l n)
f(A) = EA(f(z)) = frdA. (3.1)
For any A e MC2Zn). define the ith marginal distribution of/.., denoted
Ai e t[CiZ), by Ai(C) A((z e :Z 
nlzieC}) for all C e �.
For any z, w e :tZ n, we write z 2 w iff zi 2, wi for all i, and
we write z > w iff z 2 w but z fo. w. We say h:7l n -7 IR is monotonic3
iff, for any z, w e 1l n. z > w => h(z) > h(w). For any b e  1l .  let
Lb = {z e 1l lz ! b}. For any /.., µ £ MCll). we say A stochastically 
dominates µ, written/.. L µ iff, for all O ! b ! 1, /..(Lb) ! µ(Lb). For 
any/.., µ e !1_(7l n), we write/.. i µ iff Ai 2, µi for all i, and we write
/.. > µ iff /.. 2 µ but /.. fo. µ. 
A function f::tZ n -7 JR is stochastically monotone iff, for all
A. µ e MC Zl n>.
A ) µ => f(A) > f(µ). (3 .2) 
The function h: 7l n -7 lR is stochastically regular iff it can be
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written in the form 
h = g0f. (3 .3) 
where f:7l n -7 JR is stochastically monotone and g:lR -7 lR is
invertible on the range of g. 
Proposition !: If f:7l n -7 JR is additively separable into monotonic
n 
components. i.e., f(z) = [ f.(z.). where f.:7l -7 JR is monotonic.
l.=1 l. l. l. 
then f is stochastically monotone. 
Proof': If ). > µ, 
n 
= [ f fi (zi}d).(z)i=l 
n &Jr1cz1)dµCz)
n 
then f().} = fr<zldi.Cz) = f<[ fi(zi))d).(z)i=l 
n 
1= Jr1cz1>ctA1Cz1>l.=l 
n 
= f< [ fi(zi))dµ(z)l.=l 
n 
> �Jr1<z1ldµi(zi)
= fr<zldµCzl = f(µ). 
It follows if f is linear and monotonic. it is stochastically 
monotone. 
Q.E.D. 
We now give some examples of stochastically regular functions. 
In these examples, we let cti e JR
+, and G:JR � :m be invertible.
Example I-1· h(z) 
G(t). 
Example 3 .2 h{ z) 
n 
G( [ c:i zi). Set f( Z) 
1=1 
G( Il z�1>. Set f(z)
i=l l. 
n 
n 
[ a1z1, and g(t) 
l.=l 
[. a1 log zi1=1 
and g(t) = G(et). 
Example 3.3 h(z) = G(llzll>. Set f(z) 
4 .  ! Theorem .Q!! Common Knowledge 
f- 2 :IA. zi and g(t) = G(tl/2).
In this section, we fix A e �. and let q(w) = 
(q1(w) • • • • •  qn(w)) be defined. as in (2.3). to be the vector of 
A 
posterior probabilities of the event A. We assume that � admits a 
A 
regular conditional probability. and we fix p("I�> to be a regular 
A 
conditional probability on � given g. For any w e n. we use the 
A A 
notat1on p( "IPCw)) :f;_ -7 7l to denote p( ·I�) evaluated at w.
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Theorem 1. Let T = h0q. where h satisfies stochastic regularity. For 
• • 
almost all w e Q, if f is common knowledge at w under f. then for 
• A • 
all i e N, qi(w ) = p(AIPCw )). 
Before proceeding with the proof of the Theorem, we give an 
informal outline of the proof for the case when each r.1 is finite with 
p(P1C(1)) nA) > 0 for all i e N. ti) e n. In this case all conditional 
probabilities can be defined in the usual fashion, without recourse to 
regular conditional probabilities. 
(a) We begin by viewing qi{(J)) = p(AJP1Ct·l)) as a random
variable with values in 2Z ,  and hence q(lll) as a random vector with 
values in 2Z n. For any w* e !l, we define two conditional probability
measures on the Borel sets C of 2Z 0:
µ(C) = p({w e nlq(w) e CJIPcw•)) "'p(q-1Cc)1Pc(IJ•)) 
A.CC) = p({w e !!)q((I)) 1: CJIP'cw•) n A) = p(q-1CC>l'Pcw•) n A) 
(b) The most important step, and key to the Theorem. is to 
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observe that A > µ (i.e. A stochastically dominates µ) except for the 
A * 
case when q(w) is constant on P(w ), in which case A=µ. We discuss 
the intuition for this observation after step Cf). 
Cc) An immediate consequence of the hypothesis that T is 
common knowledge is that f(A) = f(µ), where h = g0f. 
(d) By the definition of stochastic regularity of h. and 
stochastic monotonicity of f, we know that A>µ => fCA) > f(µ). 
Ce> Putting (b). (c). and (d) together, we conclude that 
). A * µ. and q(w) is constant on P(w ) • 
A * 
(f) Since q(w) is constant on P(w ) it follows that 
* A * q1(w ) = pCAfP(tll )). 
Figure 1 provides intuition for step (b). In Figure la. the 
A * 
whole rectangle represents PCw ). We illustrate the case when 
individual i has a finite number of elements in his information 
partition. with jth element denoted Pij" So. in Figure la, the small 
rectangles represent i's information sets. Pij' which, by definition 
A A * 
of E are subsets of PC�). We define Aj = pij n A, and Bj = Pij n A. 
where A is the complement of A. Thus, P1j = Aj U Bj. For the 
particular <i1' shown in Figure la, i's information set is 
The Pi (<ii
') = P14 = A4 U B4• we write aj = p(Aj) and bj = p(Bj). 
figure is drawn with areas proportional to these probabilities. 
Figure la represents the case where Qi (<·J) varies with 
F{ 
, 
'- -W 
'{ 
�(w*)
"1 
"2 
., 
B4 
"s 
B6 
B7 
la 
Al· 
A 
A3 
. -
A 
. .  , AS' 
A 
A 
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ll(w*) 
} 
"1 
B2 
F· B3 
B4 
} 
{ 
"s AS . ·.'-
B6 A6 
., '-..1':7 
lb 
Figure 1 
A * 
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w & P ( w ) 
• 
We have drawn the figure so q1 ( w) increases as w moves 
from upper to lower information sets. Note that for each j, if 
ro • Pij' then qi(ro) = aj/Caj + bj). Writing cj = aj/(aj + bj). and
A 
using the fact that f is a coarsening of E1• we also have 
I
A * -1 p(A P(w ) n q1 (cj)) ; cj. We pick an arbitrary cj and want to show
A(L ) < µ(L ). (In Figure la. we pick j = 4 ) . We write c for c
J 
..
� � 
I
A * � Note that p(A P(w ) n q1 (L0)) =�is a weighted average of
conditional probabilities ck with each ck i c and some strict
A * � -inequalities. Hence £ < c. Similarly p(AIPCw ) n qi (Ge)) = c ) C, 
A * -
where G = (c.1]. Since p(AIP(w )) is a weighted average of s and c,c 
it follows that 
A • -1 A • pCAIPCro ) n qi (LC)) ( pCAIPCro )) • 
Expanding both sides and rearranging terms. we get 
-1 IA • -1 A • p(qi (LC) P(ro ) n A) ( p(qi (LC) I PCro ))=> A(Lc) ( µ(LC). 
which shows the stochastic dominance. 
4 7 
Setting d = [ ai. e = 1=1 
( 4.1) 
( 4.2) 
7 
[. ai.1=:> 
f = [ bi. and g = [ bi, 1=5 to be the measures of the sets labeled D .l.=l 
E, F and G in Figure la, we can verify (4.1)  by noting that 
d/(d+f) < (d+e)/(d+e+f+g). Rearranging terms, this gets translated to 
d/Cd+e) < (d+f)/(d+e+f+g). which is precisely (4.2) . 
In Figure lb. we have the case where qi(w) is constant for all 
A * A * -1 A • <o• e P(w ). In this case, p(AfP(<ol) 0 q CL0)) =- p(A)PCw )) so 
d/Cd+f) = (d+e)/(d+e+f+g) and A(Lc) = µ(Lc) • 
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The main difficulty in formalizing the above intuition is in 
defining probabilities which may be conditioned on sets of measure 
zero. To avoid this difficulty, our formal proof follows a slightly 
different route in steps (a) and (b). 
� of Theorem 1·
• 
If p(A) = o. then for all i e N, a.e. w' e n and a.e. w & n, 
A * 
we have qi(w') = 0 = p(AIP(w )), and the result is trivially true. So 
assume p(A) F 0. 
(a) We define the measure pA:J; � JR  by, for all P e i;.
• pA(P) = p(A n P)/p(A). Then let� be the q-algebra generated by 
-1 ntaking all P & !l such that P = q (C) for some C c � • It follows 
(see Breiman, Theorem 4.34. p. 7 9 )  that we can define a regular 
A * A conditional probability pAc·I�> on� given�- We write
� . . pA("IP(w)):� � Zl for the conditional probability on� evaluated at
. . Thus. for all P 
* A f A 
e � and all Q e �· pACPIPCrol)dpA(w) 
= PA(P n Q). 
Q 
* A 
Equivalently, for all P e g and Q e � 
f 
A * 
pACPIP<• lldp(rol Q n A 
= pCP n o n Al. ( 4.3)  
• 
For any t·i en, define the probability measures A.µ & �(Zln)
by, for all C & � n,
and 
-1 IA • A(C) = pA(q (C) P(• ))
( 4.4) 
µ(C) 
(b) 
pCq-1cc> lrcw•)) 
• 
From Lemma 2. it follows that for almost all w 
C e: � 
• and all i e N .
A * f p(AfP(w )) A.(C) = t dµ1(t). i c 
e: n. ai1 
( 4.5) 
But using (4.S). we can prove that for almost all w* e n. that A. 2. µ,
with 
A. > µ unless q(w) A • q(w') for p("fP(w )) 
A * 
a.e. w, w• e: P{(I) ) • 
To see (4.6). there are two cases. 
A * 
If p(AfP(w )) = 0, then 
( 4 . 6 )  
f t dµ1Ct) = 0 for all C • "'  and all i e N => µi({O}) = 1 for allc 
i e N .  But then if Q. = (0, • • • •  0) e: Zln. we have µ({.Q.}) = 1 so clearly
A 2. µ. Also ( 4.5) holds since µ({Q}) = 1 => q(w) = q(w') = O f'or
A • A •  "°" *  p("IP(w )) a.e. w,<.»' e: PCw ). On the other hand, if p(AIPCw )) fa o. 
then we apply Lemma 1 directly to get ( 4. 6 ) . 
* A * 
(c) Uext. if {o) e: Q satisfies P(w ) £ 
{i,; e !?fh(q(w)) = h(q(w
"'
))}. then. since h = g0f. and g:JR -7 m is 
invertible on f(7Z n), we have
But this implies 
A * 'l,/ ti; e: P("l ) , f(q{w)) f(q( w•)) . 
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f(A) = ff(x) dA(X) = ff(q(w)) dpA(wfP<w*>> 
* f A * = f(q(w )) dpA(wfP(w )) 
* f A * = f(q(w )) dp(wfP(w )) 
= ffCx> dµ(x) = f(µ).
(d) By the definition of stochastic regularity of h, we have 
A>µ=> f(A) > f(µ). 
(e) From (b), Cc), and (d) we conclude A= µ and q(w) is 
constant for pC·!P'cw•)) a.e. we Pew*>. 
Cf) But then, using this result together with (4.S) , we have 
* A * * 
for p a.e. w e !2,. if P(w ) �ft•> & n)h(q(w)) = h(q(w ))) , then for all
• A * 
i e N, there is a set W of pC"IPCw )) measure 1 s.t. for any w' & W, 
A • f p(AfP(w ))Ai(Zl) = Zl t dµ1(t)
f A * = ,,. * q.(w) dpCwlPCw) )) P(w ) 1 
f A • = qi(w') A * dp(11ifP(w )) P(w ) qi (w') 
..... . ..... . 
So p(AJP((l1 )) = q1(w ') for all u1' & H. I.e., for p("IPCw )) a.e.
A • A • <i> & P(w ) , qi (w) = p(A IP Cw ) ) • The result now follows using the fact
A * * 
that any set of pC"IPC�i )) measure zero, for p almost all w .  is also 
of p measure zero. 
(Q.E.D.) 
Lemma 1· Let A,µ & MC IZ ) • and assume there is a monotonic function
0:/Z � Zl such that. for all C e �, A(C) = fc (J dµ. Then A 2. µ,
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with A > µ unless µ( {t}) = l :for some t e 7l • 
Proof: For any c e 'IL, write Le = [0,c), and G0 = (c, l]. Since 
A and µ are both probability measures, we must have 
µ(Zl) = l.(Zl) = f zz 0 dµ = 1 .  So for c e Zl,
l.(L0) i µ(L0) <=> JL 0 dµ i µ(L0)c 
<=> [µ (LC) + µ(Gc>lfL 0 dµ i µ(LcHfL 0 dµ + fa 0 dµ]c c c 
<=> µ(Ge> JL O dµ i µ(Le> fa O dµ.c c ( 4 .  7) 
Now, if µ(L0)µ(G0) = 0,
(since µCL0> = O => J1 
c 
then both sides of the above inequality are o 
O dµ = o and µ(G0) = o => fa0 0 dµ = O). So 
in this case ( 4.7) is an equality. If µ(L0)µ(G0) fo 0, however, then 
( 4.7) is true iff 
f L & dµ f G 0 dµc _,c�-
µ(Lc) >. µ(Ge) 
<=> E(&IL0) i E(&)G0). 
Since 0 is monotone, we have 
EC&IL0) < O(c) < EC&IG0). 
( 4 . 8) 
So ( 4 . 8) is actually a strict inequality. Thus we have shown that for 
all c, A(L0) i µCL0), with equality for all c iff µ(L0)µ(G0) = 
o for all c. But this latter holds iff µ({t}} = 1 for some t e 'IL .
This shows A 2. µ with A > µ unless 1 ( {t}) = 1 for some t e 'IL .
Q.E.D. 
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•�±- For a.e. w e n, all C e 7l:, and all 1 e N,
f.rQQf: 
A * f p(AIPCw )Jl.1(C) = t dµ1Ct). c 
• 
We must show that for almost all w e n and all C e � ,
A • -1 A • f A 0 p(A)P(w ))pA(q1 (C) )P(w )) = _1 q.(w) dp(w)P(w )) • q (C) 1 
A 
It suffices to show that for all Q e P,' = 
f -1 A • A * • (w)pA(qi (CllPCw ))p(AIP(w ))p(dw )Q 
f f "' • • = [ _1 q1(w)p(dw)P(• ))]p(dw ).Q q (C) ( 4.9)  
But using the fact that pC " I�'> is a regular conditional probability, 
and applying ( 4 . 3 ) ,  we can write the left hand side of ( 4.9) as 
f -1 1"' * f A * * pA(qi CC) P(w ))[ p(d•IPCw ))]p(dw )Q A 
f f -1 IA • A * * = pA(q. (C) P(w ))p(dwlP(w ))p(dw )
Q A 
1 
f -1 1" • • = pA(qi (C) P(w ))p(dw )Q O A 
-1 pCq1 cc> n A n QJ. 
A -1 Since Eis a coarsening of �i' Q n qi (C) is in the a-algebra 
generated by fi. So, using (2.1). the right hand side of ( 4.9)  is 
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f • • 
Q n q-l(C)
qi(w )p(dw ) 
-1 pCq1 cc> n A n QJ. 
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= f _1 p(AIP1Cw'))p(dw*) 
Q n q (C) 
Q.E.D. 
We provide an example in which A and µ are explicitly 
calculated and the stochastic dominance of A over µ is illustrated. 
Example !-1· Let !? = {w1, . • .  ,lli6) be finite, with p(w1) = � for all i. 
Let A= !w1,oo2,t1.13l. and let n = 3, with information partitions as 
follows (we write ijk for {w1,wj'"\)): 
"1 = {126.345). Ez = !135,246). Eg (234,156). 
A 
Then P(w) = !? and 
q(w1) = t<2,2,l) 
qCw2J = tc2,i.2J 
1 qCw3J = 3Cl,2,2) 
1 qCw4J = 3Cl,
1.2) 
q(o.15) = }<l.2,
1) 
1 q(w6) = 3(2,1,1).
-1 1" -
1 
By definition. µ(C) = p(q (C) P((t))) = p(q CC)) and 
-1 µ1(C) = p(q1 (C)). So for any O ! z ! 1. 
{ ·�··· .,,
q�l( {z)) = {(1)1 ,w2 ,t.l6) 
0 
and 
if z = t 
if 2 z = 3
otherwise. 
p({w3,04,w5)) = i if z = t 
µ1((z)) = � p((w1,w2,w6J) = t if z =} 
p(D) = O otherwise. 
Similarly 1.(C) = p(q-
1
CC) IA n �(w)) = p(q-
1
(C) IA). So 
1.l((z)) 
p({w3,w4,w5Jl!w1,w2,w3J) = t 
2 p((wl,w2,w6) l!wl,w2,w3)) = 3
p(�l{w1,w2,w3J) = 0 
if z = t 
if z = � 
otherwise. 
Note that A1 > µ1• It is easy to check that Aj = A1 and 
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µj = µ1 for j = 2,3. Hence A > µ. In this example there are several 
instances in which q1(w) F qj(w), instances of deviation from 
consensus. Step (b) of the theorem goes further to say that � 
A * deviation from consensus (by any individual at any w & P(w )) yields 
A. > µ. 
Of course it is possible to define, for this example, an 
aggregation function h = g0f satisfying stochastic regularity. 
However, tp = h0q cannot be common knowledge at any tJ . (If tp were 
A 
common knowledge. f(q(tL)) = f(q(w.) ) for all ti . ti>· & P(w) = n. which l. J l. J  
implies f(A) = f(µ) . But since A>µ, we have by stochastic 
regularity f(A) > f(µ) , which is a contradiction.) 
We show by a counter example that it is not possible to weaken 
the condition of stochastic regularity to one of monotonicity and 
still obtain the result of Theorem 1. 
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Example !-6· The example is the same as Example 3.1 except we add six 
more individuals with inf'ormation partitions: 
E4 = 112s. 3461. Es = !134. 256). � = !236. 145) 
� = !124. 3561. Es= !136. 245). f9 = !235. 146). 
Then 
1 q(•1) = i(2. 2.1.2.2.1.2.2.1J
1 q(•2> = i(2.1.2.2.1.2.2.1.2J 
1 q(•3l = 3<1. 2.2.1.2.2.1.2.21 
1 q(w4) = 3<1.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.1)
1 qCw5) = 3<1. 2,1.2.1,1,1.1.2)
1 q(•5l = i(2.1.1.1.1.2.1.2.1).
It is easy to check that for no i,j do we have q(ttJi) > q(roj). 
Thus. it is possible to construct a (continuous) monotonic function, 
f: 7l 9 _, 7l such that f(q(wi)) = 0 for all i. 
" 
As before P(wi) = n
for any i. So, setting h = f, h is common knowledge at any w1• But 
* ..... . 1 2  * for t:> = t.11, we have p(A JP Cw ) ) = 2 -F 3 = q1 (oo ) , so the result of the 
theorem is not true for arbitrary monotonic statistics. 
We will need a slightly more general version of Theorem 1 to 
" 
prove Theorem 2 below. Let g be a coarsening off and g the a-algebra 
generated by g. For the following corollary we assume � admits a 
regular conditional probability, and fix p("lg) to be a regular 
conditional probability on � given Q. 
Corollary 1- Let f = h0q. where h satisfies stochastic regularity. 
" . . 
For any coarsening. g of�. for almost all w ,  e n. and p("(Q(w )) 
a.e. w' & Q(w*>. if Q(w·) � {w & n l'f(w) 
• 
fl• )). then 
• qi(•') = p!AIQ!• )) for all 1 e N. 
Proof: The proof is identical to that for Theorem 1. but with Q( w*) 
" . 
substituted for P(w ). (Note that Lemma 1 is also true for any 
coarsening g of f>. 
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Q.E.D. 
5. An Iterative Process 
We begin this ·Section with a somewhat informal discussion of 
an iterative process of public announcement which achieves common 
knowledge. We subsequently formalize the argument. This process is a 
generalization of the process suggested by Geanakoplos and 
Polemarchakis [1982] • and is similar to the dynamic learning models 
given by Jordan (1982) and Kobayashi [19771. 
f.1 
Let the initial structure of information be as follows: 
W.£;.pl 
1 1) CE1 • . . .  ·� 
h:ZO n => m
a probability space 
a collection of initial 
information partitions. 
an aggregation function 
( 5 .la) 
(5.lb) 
( 5 .le) 
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We also assume throughout this section that each individual partition 
.f� is finite and that pCP1Cw)) > O for each element P1Cw) of the join.
� 1 1 1 !: = £1. V � V • • • V !'.n·
All individuals are informed of the structure (S.la)-(S.lc) 
publicly and simultaneously so the structure of the model is itself 
4 • common knowledge. Nature then draws the true state. w 
• 
and each i is 
. 1 * 1 • informed of P1Cw ). Knowledge of P1Cw ) is private. Individual i
calculates qi<w*) = p(AIP�<w*>> and takes some action on the basis of 
this Posterior probability. As a consequence of all the actions an 
aggregation of the posterior probabilities f1Cw•) = h(q1cw•)) becomes
publicly observable. Individuals use this publicly available 
information to refine their information sets. take new actions. and so 
on. 
As the agents refine their information partitions in response 
to the public signal. it is useful to keep track of what an initially 
uninformed observer would infer from the process. An initially 
uninformed observer knows the initial structure and has access to all 
publicly available information. but has no initial private 
information. Upcn observing f1Cw*>. the observer considers the
possible ti.1 e n which could have led to the observed value. The 
observer not only knows that the true w must be in the inverse image 
• of 'f(tJ, ) • he also has enough information. from the general structure. 
to infer the inverse image set itself. We write the inverse image as 
H2cw*) {w & Q fhCq1(w)) hCq1Cw.))}
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Each i knows more than the outside observer of course. Each i 
augments the public information with his private information and 
infers the true state is in P�(w*) i * 1 •  (w ) O P1(w ). 
2 • So P1((1)) is 
i's second period information set. and we let J?.� represent the 
2 2 • partition generated by the P1Cw). It is clear that H Cw ) is common 
• 2 2 2 knowledge at w under 1?. = CJ?.1 • • • • •  fn). Everyone. including an
2 • 1 • outside observer. can construct H (w ). Further since f (w ) is 
publicly announced. everyone knows the true state is in H2Cw•).
everyone knows that everyone knows that. etc.) We can think of H2cw•)
as the observer's second period information set. when the true state 
• is w 
• 
and we can think of it as the second period common knowledge
information set. 
But the assumption that the initial information structure is 
common knowledge. an assumption traditionally made in the 
specification of Bayesian games. is a very powerful one (we did not 
use this assumption in Theorem 1). By means of this assumption. even 
before the observer sees f1Cw•) he can infer each i's second period 
information partition. Since he knows P .
• 
he knows the function q1(w) -i 
and hence the mapping ti2("). 1 • Thus even before observing T (w ) he can 
construct each i's second period partition f� = � V fi· In other
words all the second period partition structures are common knowledge 
and can be inferred by everyone including the observer as common 
• knowledge before nature draws w and i receives his private
information. This means that the inferred second period refined 
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partitions l� will be the same no matter which w is the true state. 
But of course the specific private information sets P�(w•) and P�(w•)
vary with the true state and are unknown to the observer. 
After each i learns that the true state is in P�(w•). he can 
compute the Posterior probability of A. q�(w*) = p(AfP�Cw*)). He then 
takes his second action. and after this. f2cw•) = h(q2cw*>> is 
revealed. The observer can use his knowledge of the Ri to compute 
q�(w) = p(AJP�(w)) for any w e n. and hence he can compute the inverse 
i i 
image of T2Cw•). Thus, the observer makes the inference that the true 
state is in 
ll3cro*) =(roe H2Cro*)lhCq2(w)) = h(q2Cw*)J. 
In a similar fashion, define Rf = f V f�. Again a3 (u/') is common 
• 3 3 3 knowledge. at w under f = Cf1 • . . . •  fn). and so on. 
The process is formally defined as follows: For all t•) e n. 
and all i e N, define H1(u1) = !!, and let g_
1 
be as in (5.lb}. Then, 
inductively on t. for each i e N, define for any w e n, 
qt(w) = p(AIPt(w)), 
i i 
t t t q (w) = Cq1 (N) , • • •  ,qn(ui)), 
and. for any ui t n, define 
Ht+l(oo) = {oo' t Ht(u>)Jh(qt(w'})
lit+l = {Ht+l(w)fw t n},
h(qt(ro)) J. 
(5.2a) 
(5.2b) 
( 5.2c � 
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p�+l = Ht+l V pt ::::: gt+l V p�. 
-i - -1 - -i (5.2d) 
By construction. for each w, H1Cw) 3 ir(w) a ... 2 Ht(Ul). So Jit+l is 
a refinement of Bt· As long as at+l(w) is a proper subset of Ht(w). 
the outside observer is learning. and the :fund of common knowledge is 
improving. (It is possible to construct examples. similar to those of 
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, for which the public signal is constant 
for many periods but Ht(w) is getting smaller and learning continues.) 
If, for some T. BT+l =BT. then for all t > T. �+l = fi · This means 
that there is no further refinement and the process stops. 
We say the process is in a common knowledge equilibrium if the 
current statistic is common knowledge relative to the current 
information sets. i.e • •  if �t is common knowledge under
ft= (f; ... . . �). The common sense of this definition is that the 
process has reached such a point of information refinement that the 
statistic can be inferred before it is observed, and thus its 
observation leads to no further refinement in the information sets. 
Our next theorem shows that under r.he assumptions tlade. we will 
eventually reach a common knowledge equilibrium. If the statistic, 
ip = h0q is such that h satisfies stochastic regularity. the common 
knowledge equilibrium is characterized by consensus. For this 
theorem, we write ft = f; I\ ... /\ � as the meet of the period t 
partitions. and pt(w) for the element of the meet containing w. 
Theorem ±- Assume an initial information structure as in (S.1). the 
iterative process of (S.2), and let Tt = h0qt. Then for all wen. 
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there is a T such that TT is common knowledge at� under (fi·····f�). 
Further. if h satisfies stochastic regularity. then. for any such T. 
and for all w c n, qI<wl = pCAIHTCwll = pCAl�<w>>. 
Proof: We know that for all t. Ht+l is a refinement of Ht. Further, 
each Ht is a coarsening of f. By finiteness of the �· it follows 
that f. and hence the Ht are finite. So there is a T for which 
HT+l '= .HT. For this T and for any w & n we will show 
b(qT(w))} ii? PT(w). Note (w• & il!h(qT(w')) 
Cw• c nihCqT(w')) h(qT(w))} ii? {w' c HT(w)!(h(qT(w')) = h(qT(w))] 
= HT+l(w) HT(w). So all we have to show is that H1(w) 2 ?Tew). But 
for each w e n and each i e N. Pi(w) = Pf-1cw> n HT Cw) � e1Cw) so HT 
is a common coarsening of all the fi and thus HT(w) � PT(w). The 
second assertion of the Theorem now follows directly from Corollary 1. 
setting g =HT . and letting the posterior probabilities q(w) in the 
corollary be computed with respect to the partitions (� •••• ,f�). The 
last part of the equality follows setting g = fT. 
Q.E.D. 
We now give an example illustrating Theorem 2. 
Example 5.1 Let n = {l,2,3.4,S}. n = 3, 
.!:1 = ((1,2,41. (3,5)) 
.P.z = {(1.3.51. (2,4)) 
� = { {1,5). (2,3 ,4)}. 
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Also. let A= {1,2,3}. w = 1. and h(z) Cz1 + Zz + '3)/3. Then it is 
easily checked that 
1 
_ 111 1 _u 1 _ q (w) - <3•3, 2), h(q (w)) - 18, H (w) - {1,2.3,4), 
2 2 2 8 .-2 q (w) = <3.l.1), h(q (w)) = 9• H-(w) = (1,3).
q3(w) = (1,1,1), hCq3Cw)) = 1, H3(w) = {1,3].
So the iterative process converges with t = 3, at which point all 
individuals have the same posterior probabilities for A. Note that in 
this example, the posterior probabilities are the same as they would 
be under pooled information. even though the pooled information. 
{w) = n P. (">) = Pew). is not common knowledge. 
i i 
Although all posterior probabilities must agree when the 
statistic satisfies stochastic regularity and¢ becomes common 
knowledge, these posteriors in general need not be the same as those 
from pooled information. In other words we need not have 
p(A!PcN*)) = PCAIP'cvi*)). The same example as that used by Geanakoplos 
and Polemarchakis [1982, p. 198] serves to illustrate this point. 
Also. it is possible to construct examples for n individuals where the 
iterative process takes any finite number of steps to converge, and it 
is possible to construct examples where there is no evident revision 
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in individual posteriors until the last step. However. we conjecture 
that if the event A is chosen randomly from a non atomic state space, 
as in Proposition 4 of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis. that the 
iterative process will converge. with probability one. in less than or 
equal to n iterations. to the pooled information situation (in 
Kobayashi's [1977) model convergence takes n steps). 
6. Rational Expectations and� Knowledge 
The idea underlying rational expectations equilibria is that 
each individual has a model. or belief. of the form of the public 
information. In equilibrium. these beliefs are "rational" in the 
sense that when individuals act on them. the beliefs end up not being 
contradicted. We now show the connection between the common knowledge 
approach and the idea of rational expectations. 
In the previous development, we have suppressed the dependence 
of the public information on the information partition. The 
statistics we have considered are of the form <f:!l -7 A. where fl = JR 
and fCo>l = h'q(<o) = h(p(AJP1Cw)) ..... p(AJP0(w))). For arbitrary 
partitions R = <R1 • • • • • .ftn), we can express the dependence of <p on .R by 
writing 
fC<o,Jl) 
= h'q(w,Jl) = h(p(AJR1 (w)) ... .,p(AJR0(w))) (6.1) 
where qi (w,R) = p(A IRi (o>)). In general <j>(tt1,B_) could be an arbitrary
function which need not take the particular from above. For example, 
if <f(w,ft) represents the Walrasian equilibrium price correspondence, 
in general it would depend on the whole posterior probability 
distributions, pC"IR1Cw)), rather than just on the posterior 
probabilities of a given event. 
In a rational expectations equilibrium, it is assumed each 
individual has a model, O:D. -7 A of f(w,B.>. and uses d(w) together 
with his private information to condition his beliefs and actions. 
Thus, for w e il, let Hd(w) = {w• e: !ll<i'.Cw') = d(t<>)) and 
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.lid = {Hd(w) lw e !l). We write �. i  = fi V Ba for the join of � and Bd. 
with elements of the form Pd.i(w) = 
p
i(w) n HG(w). and write 
:e0 = c:e1 v 1!0 • • • • •  i;, v J!o> • 
We can now define a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) 
under F. to be a � measurable function d:!! � fl which satisfies 
f(w,:E.l = o(w) (6.2) 
for all w e n. So in a rational expectations equilibrium. if 
individuals act on their beliefs. the beliefs are confirmed. If d is 
a REE under l and Ed= (f,f., ... ,f). then d is called a Fully Revealing 
REE. So in a fully revealing REE, each individual ends up obtaining 
all the information available to everyone. 
The following theorem shows the close connection between the 
notion of common knowledge and a REE. In this proposition, when we 
sa:l• d is common knowledge under R = (R1, • • • • .Rn). we mean that it is 
common knowledge at t,1 under R for all w e !'?.
Theorem 2, Let <$: !? � A. Then 
(a) d is a REE under f => d is common knowledge under ld. 
(b) If dis defined by O(w) = f(w,f), then dis common knowledge 
under f => d is a REE under f. 
Proof: 
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(a) Let d be a REE under f. So d(w) = fCw,fo> for all w & n.
A 
We must show that for any w e il, �Cw) !: {w' e nldCw'} = d(w)} 
= H0Cw). But this follows from the fact that fo,i = � V � ·so that
H0 is a common coarsening of the .f.e.1•
(b) Let d(w) = f(w,.f.) be common knowledge under f. Then for 
A 
all wen. �(wl � {w' e Qfo(w') ; o(w)J ; H0(w). So 
P1(w) 0 Hd(w) = Pi(w) for all l•I & !l. Hence E_d = .f., so 
d(t\)) = 'f(w,E_) = f(w.fd), so d is a REE under P. 
Q.E.D. 
J 
For the following corolla_ries. we let A = {Aj} j=l be a fixed
collection of sets with Aj !: n for each j. Assume that for each n­
tuple of partitions. R = <.B.1 • • • • •  Rn>. that f( · .R> :n � /:J. has range
l:J. 
= 
:mJ, and write fj(w,ji) for the j
th component of f(w,B.). Also.
write qj(w,.R) for the vector with ith component qi(w,Rl = p(AjlR1(w)). 
The following corollary gives conditions on f(w,.R) guaranteeing that 
every REE will achieve consensus. 
Corollary .f. Let TC· ,Il,) :!? -> JR J satisfy f j((l),.H.> = hoq
j(t� • .R> for all 
.R. all w e a, and all 1 i j ! J. Assume h is stochastically regular. 
If d:!l � JRJ is a REE under f, then for a.e. oo e n, qi(t'},Eq,> 
q �(w,f.;) A p(Ajff0(w)) for all i,k,j. 
Proof: Since d is a REE under f. we have d(w) = f(w,fo> for all 
w en. By Theorem 3 .  dis common knowledge under f0• Hence 
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dj(w) = f j(w.�) is common knowledge at w unde: � for all 1 ! j ! J.
The result is now a direct application of Theorem 1. 
Q.E.D. 
The final corollary gives a condition on A= {Aj}�=l 
guaranteeing that every REE is fully revealing. The condition is that 
the events Aj lead to a partition which is at least as fine as the
pooled information. We conjecture that there are much more general 
conditions than those given in this corollary which yield the same 
result. In fact we conjecture that such a result is generically true. 
However the condition here is of some interest as it corresponds to 
the information structures which have been used in experimental work 
on rational expectations equilibria (see. eg., Plott and Sunder 
[1983)) . 
Corollary � Assume ! is a partition, that A is a refinement of f. and
that p(A j) > O for all j. Assume f(" .R> satisfies the conditions of
Corollary 2. Then if <J: n � :m J is a REE under f. it is a fully 
revealing REE. 
f!:::Q.Qf: As above. we have d is common knowledge under fd. For 
convenience. write fd,i = Ri for all i.
• • 
that R1(w ) = Rk(w ) for all i. k e N. 
• 
Now pick w e Q. We prove 
Assume not, and assume, 
• • • 
w.l.o.g • •  that w' & R1((1)) - Rk(w ). Then Rk(oo') n Rk(w ) = 0. But 
since A is a partition and it refines f. we can pick Aj e A with 
- . Aj � R(w ) , which implies 
• Aj � Rk(w ). So Aj 0 Rk{w') =�. and hence
p(AjiRk(w')) = 0. Now hl
' 
A • 
e P(w ). So by Theorem 1. we have 
p(AjJRk(w
.)) = p(AjJRi(w')) = p(AjJRi(w
•)) = p(AjJRk(w')) = 0
But • • p(AjlRk(w )) = p(Aj)/p(Rk(w )) fo 0, a contradiction. But then 
• R1Cw )
• Rk(w ) for all i, k e N .  I.e. fe,i  = fe,k = �4 for all i,k.
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But each f�.i is a refinement of i1• and a coarsening of f (since 
4 is
�measurable). Hence, fd f. So l4 (P:• . • • •  f> . 
Q.E.D. 
The above results, together with our theorems of the previous 
sections can be used to characterize the properties of rational 
expectations equilibria in certain situations. The examples of the 
next section illustrate applications. 
7. Some Examples 
We now return to Examples 1-4 sketched in the introduction. 
to show how public information of the form assumed in our theorems 
arises in various settings. For this section. we assume n = S X Yn.
where Y is an arbitrary set from which individual private signals are 
drawn. and S = {s1.s2 • . . .  ,s3} is a finite set of "utility relevant" 
states of the world. So elements of n are written w = Cs.y). where 
s c S and y =  (y1, . • .  ,yn) c y
n. The individual information partitions
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are then defined by 
fi = (Pi(w)iw e n}
where, for w = (s.y) & n.
Pi(w) = (w'=(s',y') e nlyi' = y1J. 
In addition, let X be a set from which individual i selects a 
decision. Given w & il, we let X(w) = Cx
1
(w), • • •  ,xn(w)) e X
n be the
decisions selected by each i e N (to be described in further detail in 
the examples). Then in each of the following examples, we assume 
individuals use their private information to make decisions xCw). A 
function f(w) = �0x(w) is then made public, where �:Xn � m is some
aggregation of individual decisions. In each case, we show that T is 
of the form required by our theorems. 
Example 1 ! Delphi Process 
In this example. each of n experts is asked to report his 
posterior probability of an event. and then an aggregate function of 
the reports is made public. We can writes= {0,1}. with s =  1 being 
the event of interest . Write A = {w c nJs = 1). and 
qi(w) = p(A!Pi(w)). Let X = 7l be the set of pcssible reports by i.
Then. assuming each expert reports truthfully. we have xi(w) = qi(w),
so x(w) = q(w). We assume the public information is of the form 
<p({r)) = 11°x{w). Clearly, if T\ is stochastically regular. then setting 
h = 11• ,, can be written in the form T = h0q. which is of the form 
required by our theorems. 
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Note that we can induce truthful reporting in this example if' 
the experts are paid for their reports using a proper scoring rule 
{ see. eg., De Finetti [1970] or Savage (1971] for definitions of 
proper scoring rules). For example. if the quadratic loss proper 
scoring rule is used, then expert 1 will have a utility function 
u1 :X X S � JR of the form 
2 ui (xi ,s) = 1 - Cx - s) • 
X to maximize Then, given w e O .  each i e N will choose xi e 
E[ui(xi , s)IPi(w)] = (1 - x�)(l - qi(w)) + (2xi - x�) q1Cw). Since u1 
is a proper scoring rule, the maximization yields xi(w) = qi(w). 
Example l. Decentralized Risk Assessment � Cournot Oligopolists 
In this example. firms pick levels of production of a chemical 
based on information obtained from private toxilogical tests. and then 
observe data on the market price of the chemical. 
Here again. we can write S = {0.1}. with s 1 indicating the 
chemical is toxic, A = {w e O l s  = l} being the event that the chemical 
is toxic, and qi(w) = pCA I Pi(w)). Let X = :m + be the set of possible
production levels of the firm. Let D-l: :m + � JR +  be the inverse
demand function. and Ci : m  + _,. :m be firm i's cost function. Given a 
choice x = C x1 • • . . •  xn) e x0 of production levels o� all n firms. we 
can write the profit function of firm i. ni :X
n X S _,. JR by 
-1 -
{ xiD (x) - Ci(xiJ 
ni (x.s) = _1 _ xiD (x) - Ci(xi) - yxi 
if s = 0 
if s = 1
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n 
where x fu x1 • and y c 1l is the proportional liability. Hence the 
expected profit is of the form 
-1 -ECn1Cx,s>IP1(w)} = x1D (x) - c1cx1> - yq1Cwlx1• 
We assume that the inverse demand is linear, of the form 
D-1Cx) = a - bx. with a > 0, b > 0, and that individual cost functions 
are quadratic , of the form c1cx1> = c1x�/2 + d1x1 + e1• with 
c1, d1 , e1 > O. It follows that if firms use only their private 
information. and do not try and learn from contemporaneous prices or 
total production of others. the unique Cournot Nash equilibrium occurs 
when 
x(w) = A-1y - yA-1q(w) 
where A is an n X n matrix with elements 
{ b 
A -ij 2b + Ci 
if i 1' j
if i = j, 
y is an n X 1 vector with elements yi =a - di' and x(w) and q(w) are 
n X 1 column vectors with elements xi(w) and qi(w), respectively. We 
can solve for the resultant price. TCw) by writing 
<J'(w) = 11°x(w) = D-1Cv' x(w)) 
where v •  (1,1, •.. ,1) i s  the n X 1 vector of ones. Substituting the 
value of x(w), this can be rewritten in the form 
(PCN) = [a - bv'A-1y1 + byv'A-1q(vi).. 
It can be shown that the elements of the vector v'A-l are all 
positive,5 so this is a monotonic. linear function of the qi(w), and 
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hence is of the form �(w) = h0q(w) required for our theorems . Note 
that if demand is completely elastic (with b = 0) , then XCw) = v•x(w) 
is still a statistic of the form required for our theorems. 
Example ! Parimutuel Betting 
In this example. n individuals have private information. and 
bet on the outcome of a horse race . They then observe public 
information on the bets of others in the form of the odds on the 
totalizer. Here . the utility relevant states are the events that each 
horse wins. Let s = sj indicate that horse j wins. 
Aj = {l•J t n l s  = sj} be the event that j wins. and write 
qi(w) = p(Aj l Pi ( w ) )  for i ' s  posterior probability of horse j winning . 
We let X � JR  J+l be the set of possible state contingent money 
holdings that an individual can choose from. Elements of X are of the 
form xi ( xiO 'xi1 • • • • •  xiJ) .  and represent the situation where i 
chooses a bet which leaves him xiO for current consumption, and which 
will earn winnings of xij if state 
j occurs. Individual utility 
fUnctions ui :X X S -? JR are assumed to be of the form 
ui {xi . sj ) = xiO + a.i ln xij ' 
where ai > O for each i .  Further each i t N has initial endowment of 
e1 e IR • 
Now if all individuals just use their private information. and 
do not try and learn from the posted odds, then we can compute the 
equilibrium odds f(w) = C T1 Cw) , • • .  ,fJ( tiJ ) }  for each horse as follows:
If r = Cr1 • • • • •  rJ) are the posted odds for horses 
1 
• • • • •  J, 
espectively. then the implicit prices for state j winnings are 
39 
j = �-
1
�
-1 • so individual i ' s  optimization problem is the following : rj + 
max E [u1 Cx1 ,sl iP1 C w ) ]  
x1 eX 
s . t .  x10 + [pjxij .S. e1 
r, equivalently 
max (xiO x1ex 
J 
+ [ 
J=l 
a.iqi(w) ln xij ] 
s . t .  x10 + [ pjxij i. e1• 
;etting up the Lagrangean. and solving. this yields 
a . .
x . .  (w)  = _!qJ (w)1J pj i 
low the total take on each horse is 
tj = 
n 
[ p .x1j (w) . 
l.=l J 
�nd. ( ignoring the track take ) the odds of the totalizer are set so 
:.hat r j ( f tk) /t j . Equivalently, k'Fj 
t .  
p .  = _.J._ 
n [ P .x . .  {w) 
1-1 J l.J 
n . [
a.1qI <
<I)) 
:i.=l 
J J 
[ t
k=l k 
J n 
k�l�/kxik ( w)
n J k 
�1 a.ik� qi ( tiJ) 
= \ [_'l_lqj (w) . 
l;;.1 [ °'le l. 
k=l J 
Thus. using the fact that rj = Cl/pj ) - 1 .  we can write the
equilibrium odds. given that everyone acts only on his private 
information. P1(w ) ,  as 
rj = f/wl = h'q
j (w)
where h:7l n --)- m is defined 
n 
n 
by h(z) = C l/[ �1z1l 
l.=l 
- 1 where 
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�i = a1/c � '1<) . Clearly, h can be written in the form h = g0f, wherek� 
n 
g(t) = C l/t) - 1 ,  and f(z) = I: �1z1• But g is monotonic. and f is 
i=l 
linear and monotonic,  hence stochastically regular, so by Proposition 
1. f j is of the form required for our theorem.
Example i Markets !!1th Incomplete Information 
This example considers the case of an economy with incomplete 
information. in which there is a complete set of state contingent 
futures markets. as developed in Grossman (1981 ] . Individual agents. 
each with private information, trade in futures contracts and then 
observe the market clearing price. So S = Cs1 • • • •  ,sJ} is a finite set
of J states of the world. and Aj
q{(w) = p(Aj lP1(w) ) .  We let X =
{w=(s,y) e nls = sjl .  with
( JR  +) J+l be a feasible consumption
set. with typical element denoted xi = Cxi0 .x11 • • • • •  xiJ) and assume
each individual has a state contingent utility function 
ui :X X S => JR .  so that ui(xi .s) represents i 's  utility for state
contingent consumption of x10 in the present. and xij in state j .
given that state s occurs. Each individual also has a state 
contingent endowment e1 & X and a vector of shares e1 = ce11 • • • •  ,0iF) 
of ownership in each of F firms. Now. once ro is drawn, each 
individual can compute posterior probabilities. conditional on his 
private information, of each future state of the world: 
q{(w) = p(Aj lP1(w) ) .
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Thus, given any price vector. p = Cp1 .p2 • • • •  ,pJ) • each individual can 
choose a consumption bundle x1 e X to maximize 
J . 
E<u1cx1 ,s> IP1Cw) ) = [ u1cx1.s . > qr<w>
J=l J 
subject to the budget constraint imposed by the value of his 
endowment . Similarly, firms maximize profits at the given prices. 
(Se� Grossman [1981 , p.  547] for details) , resulting in the usual 
Walrasian market clearing price. We write f(w) , for the Walrasian 
equilibrium price vector as a function of w, where individuals act 
only on their private information. and do not try and learn from the 
price. 
Under the special case. when utility functions are given by 
ui(xi ,sj )
and endowments satisfy 
n 
[_ e1j = 1 
l.=l 
<ii ln xij + xiO
for all 1 i j i K.
Grossman (1981 , p. 548] shows that the Walrasian correspondence 
satisfies , for each j
�/'" 
h . 
G( \ a. .q�( t>)) )  &1 1 l. 
where G is a m on ot one increasing functi on. Cle arly. we can write 
tj = h 'q
j
n . 
where h ::ZZ n _, JR  is de fine d by h (z) = G( [ a.i zi) an d q J :n  _, :ZZ n is· l.=l 
de fine d by qi(w) = p(Aj fP1( w) ) .  F urther we kn ow fr om E xample 3. 1 that 
h is st ochastically reg ular. s o  f j is of the form req uire d for our 
the orem. 
Disc ussi on 
All four of the ab ove e xamples have a c omm on str uct ure. In 
each e xample, in divi duals have private in formati on 1?. = Cf1 • . . . • 1?_n) •
act on this in formati on. yiel ding x(w) an d. for any w e n. this gives 
rise t o  p ublic in formati on 'fl(w)
= 
�ox(w) = hOq(w) . which is e xactly of 
the form req uire d by our the orems. There fore. we can apply our 
the orems t o  each e xample. 
First. fr om The orem 1, it foll ows. for all of the ab ove 
e xamples. that when the p ublic in formati on. f.  is c omm on knowle dge, 
there is c onsens us on the un derlying p osteri or pr obabilities. In 
A 
e xamples 1 an d 2 .  this means that qi (w) = qk(w) = p ( A I P ( w ) )  for all 
i,k e N. S o  in E xample 1, when the a gregate in formati on is c om mon 
kn owle dge. all e xperts agree on the p osteri or pr obability of the event 
occ urring, an d in E xample 2 ,  when price is c omm on kn owle dge. every 
firm agrees on the pr obability the chemical is t oxic. In E xamples 3
an d 4, 'fl(!:l) = <T1 (w) • • • •  ,q>J ( to) ) is vect or val ue d. s o  i f  <p is COilllll.On 
kn owle dge at w. 
q i (t•J) j q k(w)
then �/w) 
A 
p(Aj )P(<-> ) )
is c omm on kn owle dge a t  w for each j .  Hence 
for all i , k e N. an d 1 ! j ! J. Hence. in 
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�ample 3 ,  once the odds are c omm on kn owle dge . then for every h orse, 
Ll bett ors agree on the p osteri or pr obability that that h orse will 
in. In E xample 4 ,  once the state c ontingent prices are c omm on 
n owle dge, then for eve ry state. all agents agree on the p osteri or 
r obability of that state occ urring. 
Sec on d. fr om The orem 2 ,  i f  in formati on part iti ons are finite. 
t foll ows that for all of the ab ove e xamples. the iterative pr ocess 
e fine d in ( S .2) c onverges t o  a c omm on kn owle dge eq uilibri um 
haracteri ze d  by c onsens us. 
T o  implement the iterative pr ocess of ( S �2) for the e xamples 
.b ove, we w oul d repeate dly, with out re drawin g !!!.
• 
face the in divi duals
rith the decisi on task describe d in each e xample. Th us .  in each 
:xample. we w oul d  have a series of decisi on peri ods. In peri od t, 
.n divi duals ch oose optimal acti ons xt (w) = <xi(w) , • • •
• 
x�(w) ) base d on 
�heir c urre nt in formati on partiti ons f
t. The aggregate in formati on 
pt (w) = �oxt(w) is th en ma de p ublic, an d base d on this, in divi duals 
�e fine their in formati on partiti ons t o  obtain f
t +l . as describe d in 
( 5 .2) . Fr om The orem 2 .  it foll ows that in � of the ab ove e xamples, 
there is a t  for which Tt is c omm on kn owle dge at 0 un der f
t, an d that 
for this t. we have c onsens us :  I.e., p(Aj (pr( w ) ) = p(Aj !P�(w) ) 
p(A . lpt (t:J) ) for all 1 ,!, j ! J an d i, k t  N .J 
It sh oul d  be emphasi ze d  that in implementing this iterative 
pr oce dure . there is only � reali zati on of w, an d all s ubseq uent 
decisi ons. xt (oo) , are taken with respect t o  the in formati on that is
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generated by this w .  I n  each period, the action xt (w)  must actually 
be taken. in order to generate information for subsequent periods. 
However. the payoffs cannot actually be made until the entire process 
is completed. since the payoffs themselves reveal information about 
the true state . w. 
In Example 1 ,  the iterative process described above is exactly 
the "Delphi'' process. in which individual experts make reports. an 
aggregate function of their reports is made public, they make new 
reports. etc. Theorem 2 shows that this process leads eventually to 
consensus . In Example 2 ,  the iterative process described above 
corresponds to a situation in which there are several production 
periods. firms are faced with proportional liability for their share 
of the total production in each period, but they do not learn of the 
actual state (whether the chemical is toxic) until some later date. 
Here. Theorem 2 would suggest that such a proportional liability 
scheme would result in firms converging to identical beliefs about 
toxicity. It is somewhat more difficult to imagine natural methods of 
implementing the above iterative process in Examples 3 and 4. 
Finally. for each of the above examples. we can define a REE. 
Using the notation of Section 6. we write qI(e.R) = p(Aj!R1(w) ) to 
indicate the posterior probabilities of Aj given B. = CR1 • • • .  ,Rn_) . In 
each example we denote the public information as a function of the 
initial information partitions by f(w,R) . It follows from the same 
analysis that is done for f. that in each example. we can write f C w .R) 
in the form fj( oo,R) = h0q
j (w.R) . where. now . from Theorems 1 ,  3 .  and 
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Corollary 2 ,  we get the following results: 
(a) If. for all w, d(w) = f(w ,f) is common knowledge at w under f. 
then d is a REE (Theorem 3b) and for almost all w• t n. for all 
' * . • A * 
j, qi(w ,f) = q�( w  .,f) = p(Aj (f(w ) ) )  (Theorem 1 ) . Further, with 
finite information partitions, such a REE can be found by the 
iterative process of Theorem 2 .  
Cb) If �(w) = f C�.�d) is a REE. then d is common knowledge under �
(Theorem 3a) . and is characterized by consensus (Corollary 2) . 
• • • 
I. e . ,  for almost all w • n ,  p(AjlP0,1Cw ) )  = p(AjlP0,kCw ) )
A * p(AjlP/w ) ) for all i , k  • N ,  1 i j i J . 
In addition. the result of Corollary 3 is relevant to Examples 
3 and 4 (although the information structure assumed there would only 
be likely to occur in Example 4) . So we also have . for these 
examples : 
J -
Cc) If ! =  {A j} j=l is a refinement of t with p(Aj) > o for all 
j .
then every REE is fully revealing (Corollary 3 ) . Thus, with 
finite information partitions. there is a unique REE. (existence 
follows from Theorem 2 ) . 
Thus. for each of the above examples, all REE 's are 
characterized by consensus , and every common knowledge equilibrium 
gives rise to a REE with consensus . 
In Examples 3 and 4 ,  we obtain conditions on the information 
structure guaranteeing that there is a unique REE. and guaranteeing 
that REE is fully revealing . 
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A "paradox" of a fully revealing REE is that it appears to 
lack incentives for research (each 1 does just as well by conditioning 
on the public information alone and "throwing his private information 
away") . However. as Dubey, Geanakoplos. Shubic (1982] points out. and 
as is clear from this paper, there are indeed incentives for research 
during the iterative process. 
Summarizing the above results. we see that our theorems have 
non-obvious implications in each of the above examples. 
In Example 1 ,  our approach gives a theoretical foundation for 
Delphi processes. In the literature on this subject. it has been 
claimed that such processes yield consensus among experts and are 
effective means of pooling the information of experts. However, there 
has been no adequate theoretical work from which such conclusions have 
been derived. Our analysis gives a way of addressing such questions 
theoretically, and our theorems give support for the claims made for 
such processes. 
Our model of oligopolists . in Example 2 ,  is formally 
equivalent�in the case of linear demand and only two states of the 
world�to models studied by Novshek and Sonnenschein (19721 . Clarke 
(1984] and others. who assume the source of uncertainty is in the 
intercept of the demand function. rather than in the cost function. 
That literature shows that there are no incentives for firms to share 
information unless they can cooperate in the choice of production 
levels. Our analysis is at odds with this. in that we show that in a 
REE. firms acting non-cooperatively £.ru1 not help sharing information. 
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at least to the extent that they will end up agreeing with each other 
on their beliefs on the relevant posterior probabilities. Thus. when 
firms act on their private information. they end up sharing it with 
others. 
In the parimutuel betting example of Example 3 ,  our analysis 
shows that in a REE. bettors achieve consensus in beliefs. and hence 
all bets are fair bets. ( However. since bettors are not risk neutral . 
they still prefer to bet) . Empirical studies such as Hoerl and Fallin 
(19741 suggest that the final totalizer odds �. in fact, close to 
fair bets <except for the track take) . 
In the example of markets with incomplete information, 
GroSsman (1982] proves the existence of a fully revealing REE. 
However, he does not address questions of uniqueness or try to 
characterize REE ' s  other than the fully revealing REE. The theorems 
of this paper give some tools for doing so. In particular. when 
preferences are as specified in Example 4 .  we show that every REE must 
achieve consensus . so that all agents agree on the probability of each 
state of the world. We can also identify certain conditions on the 
initial information partitions ( there are undoubtedly other such 
conditions) which guarantee that every REE is a fully revealing REE, 
and hence guarantee uniqueness of the P.EE. To our knowledge such 
questions have not previously been addressed in the literature on 
rational expectations equilibria. 
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8. Conclusion 
Markets distribute information as well as goods. And just as 
markets tend to bring preferences into agreement. on the margin. as 
individuals equate their marginal rates of substitution, markets may 
also align beliefs. as individuals make inferences from publicly 
available information such as prices. 
Using the concept of common knowledge. we investigate the 
process of information aggregation and the tendency of beliefs to 
converge towards consensus . In addition to market settings . the 
analysis is applied to other situations such as Delphi processes and 
parimutuel betting . 
FOOT!!OTES 
1. The meet of two partitions is their finest common coarsening. 
The join of two partitions in their coarsest common refinement . 
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2 .  The statement "i knows E "  is interpreted to mean that P1(t.i>) !;;: E.
One could use instead the weaker condition that i knows E iff 
p ( E I P1Cw))  = 1 .  I n  this case, the corresponding definition of 
common knowledge would not bear the same relationship to the 
meet. and the analysis is considerably complicated. We do not 
investigate this alternative definition here. 
3 .  Note that the definition of monotonicity here is what is usually 
called strict monotonicity. 
4 .  To formalize the notion that the probability space and 
information partitions are themselves common knowledge would 
require us to embed the entire problem in a larger product space 
in which first individuals are informed of the relevant 
probability space and information partitions of ( S.1) , and then 
of the particular partition element of li which occurs. We do 
not attempt to formalize this here. and in that sense the 
discussions in this and the following paragraphs is only 
intuitive. 
5 .  To see that [v 'A-1 1 .  is pcsitive, note that A-l has elements J 
;;:-:- - ( 1  + Kb) A - A -
. . J l. J 
{ 1 b 
aiJ = b 
- ( 1  + Kb)AiAj 
if i = j 
if i f. j
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where Ak b + ck . and 
n 1 K = [ ,_ .  
li=l k 
Hence {v'A-1 1
j 
n 
[ aij 1=1 
1/l.j( l  + Kb) > 0 .
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